Performance Analysis of the German Banking Sector before and throughout the recent Financial Crisis 2001-2015 by Serafeimidis, Antonios
  
 
Performance Analysis of the 
German Banking Sector before 
and throughout the recent 
Financial Crisis 
2001-2015 
 
Antonios Serafeimidis 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION & LEGAL STUDIES 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Executive MBA 
 
 
 
 
March 2018 
Thessaloniki-Greece 
ii 
 
 
Student Name: Antonios Serafeimidis 
SID:                   1101160011 
Supervisor:                                    Dr. Stergios Leventis 
                            Dr. Christos Grose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 
another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the 
Student’s Handbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2018 
Thessaloniki - Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the Executive MBA at the International Hellenic 
University. 
The aim of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it describes, using ratio analysis, certain 
aspects of the German Banking system, over the period 2001-2015, and on the other hand, it 
examines, the determinants of bank profitability (for all types of German banks) over the 
aforementioned period. A unique feature of the German banking system has to do with its 
“three-pillared” structure, as it comprises of three types of banking institutions, namely (a) 
private commercial banks, (b) savings banks, and (c) cooperative banks. 
Despite the onset of the recent fiscal crisis of 2007/2008, and the somewhat significant 
decline in the banks’ efficiency (captured by a rising cost-to-income ratio), the profitability of 
the German Banking system remained almost intact, as it was reflected by Return on 
(Average) Assets. ROA and was not severely affected, as the annual average decline over the 
period under examination was a mere 0.91%. In addition, the German banking system came 
out of crisis with a larger capital adequacy, as the relevant ratio increased over the period 
under examination, and a higher liquidity, as this is captured by the ratio of bank credit to 
total deposits. 
To measure bank performance, this study makes use of the banks’ Return on Equity (ROE) on 
a pretax basis. The empirical evidence showed that banking factors such as liquidity risk 
(ratio of bank credit to bank deposits), capital adequacy (ratio of bank capital to total assets), 
efficiency (ratio of operating income to cost), and the 5-bank concentration ratio have a 
positive effect on bank profitability. 
Finally, I want to thank my supervisors, Dr. Stergios Leventis and Dr. Christos Grose, for their 
orientation and correspondence to all my questions. I am grateful to those people whose 
sapience and inspiration supported me during the writing of this study and I would like to 
acknowledge the hospitality of all the personnel of the International Hellenic University. At 
the end, I am grateful for my family’s financial support and encouragement throughout my 
studies and for giving me the opportunity to gain these experiences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
At the onset a distinction must be made between the terms “financial sector” and “financial 
system”. Initially, the financial sector comprises the financial institutions of a country, 
whereas the financial system describes the interactions between the financial sector, being a 
supplier of financial services, and the ‘real economy’, being the buyer of these services1. 
Financial systems are usually classified as being either bank-based or capital-market-based. 
Germany, along with Japan, is considered as the prototype of a country with a bank-based 
financial system (e.g. Allen and Gale 2001). 
A distinctive characteristic of the German financial system is that the banking system 
prevails over the capital markets. Indeed, compared to the US, German firms are largely 
financed by the banking sector, while households hold a larger share of their financial wealth 
in the form of bank deposits (Detzer et al. 2014). As a result, the German capital markets 
exhibit a relatively small number of listed companies and own the virtue of a low stock and 
bond market capitalization, considered, consequently, as less developed. 
German banks play a significant role not only in the German financial sector, but even 
in the entire international financial system. The German banking system is based on three 
pillars, i.e. three several types of banking institutions (or groups of banks), like (a) the large 
commercial banks, (b) the savings-group banks, and (c) the cooperative-group banks2 (Behr 
and Schmidt, 2015). The first category of banks is more profit-oriented compared to the 
banks in the other two categories. 
The Financial Crisis 2007/08, which began in the US, stabilized a trend, which had been 
unfolding since the 1990s, namely the financial markets liberalization, characterized by 
rapidly growing interbank and capital markets. Specifically, in the wake of the Lehman 
Brothers failure in September 2008 banks started facing a high liquidity risk, as it became 
more difficult and more expensive for banks to obtain funding from the interbank market. 
                                                 
1 See Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) on the importance of this terminological distinction 
2 The German banking system includes also an additional, “fourth pillar, namely that of ‘other banks’ 
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Even though the German banking system was highly exposed to US assets (Detzer, 
2014), the impact of the fiscal crisis on the country’s financial system, which is 
predominantly bank-based, was not severe enough to lead to a credit crunch, thereby 
aggravating the crisis in Germany’s real economy. This observation is rather interesting, 
particularly if we take into consideration the magnitude of the asset write-off, undertaken by 
the large German financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) throughout the 
financial crisis. In a detailed review, Detzer (2014) states that German financial institutions 
were forced to write off assets valued at €102 billion, for a period stretching from 2007 to 
2009:08. This figure proves quite significant, especially if we compare it with total capital 
reserves of German banks (€428 billion at the end of 2007) and insurance companies (€284 
billion for the same period) (Detzer,2014). 
 
1.2 AIM AND IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.2.1 The Aim of the Study 
The aim of the study is to assess the effect of the 2007/2008 financial crisis (henceforth 
“financial crisis”) on the performance of the German banking sector, over the period 2001-
2015. Two approaches shall be used to assess the performance of the German banking 
sector during the aforementioned period. The first, and more descriptive approach, shall 
examine the effect of the recent financial crisis on the three types of banking institutions 
using some performance indicators, such as the return on equity, the cost-income ratio, and 
lastly, interest margins. 
Under the second, econometric approach, the determinants of German bank 
profitability will be detected. The literature on the determinants of bank sector profitability 
is vast and is divided into two broad categories. The first category involves empirical studies 
focusing on the determinants of bank profitability in specific countries, while the second 
group of studies makes use of panel data of countries. Some examples of the first group of 
studies involve those of Angbazo (1997) for US, Alexiou and Sofoklis, (2009) for Greece, 
Horvath (2009) for Czech Republic, Kundid et al., (2011) for Croatia and others. Examples of 
studies that have made use of panel data to examine the determinants of bank profitability 
are those of Molyneux and Thornton (1992), who investigated bank profitability in 18 
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European countries over the period 1986- 1989, and Goddard et.al (2004), who analyzed the 
bank profitability in 6 European countries over the period 1992- 1998. 
So, within the framework of the first strand of analysis, performance of the German 
banking sector will be regressed against, a time-varying concentration ratio, its market 
share, several bank-specific variables, and a dummy variable envisaging the effect of the 
crisis on bank profitability. To assess bank performance, we shall rely on bank profitability 
measures, such as the bank’s Return on Assets (ROA), or the bank’s Return on Equity (ROE). 
Also, under the same approach, every bank’s revenues, as presented by the ratio of 
Interest Income to Total Earning Assets, will be regressed against the ratios (a) of personnel 
expenses to total assets; (b) of equity to fixed assets; and lastly (c) of interest expenses to 
overall funding. Additionally, a column vector of control variables will be included, 
comprising the following variables; (a) the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total assets, used 
as a proxy of credit risk (b) the natural logarithm of total assets, in an effort to control for the 
size effect on bank revenues, and (c) the GDP growth rate. As it was demonstrated by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987), differences regarding the market structure imply different constraints on 
the sum of input elasticities of this model. 
At this point we need to stress that under the econometric approach, our sample will 
be limited to private banks. The exclusion of savings and cooperative banks is justified by 
their contradicting performance during the financial crisis. These banks’ performance 
remained quite intact, whereas some of them even managed to record profits, during the 
turbulent period (Behr and Schmidt, 2015). Simultaneously, some important private German 
banks, like the two specialized private banks, Hypo Real Estate (HRE) and Industrie-
Kreditbank (IKB) and the two ‘big banks’ Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, were severely 
hit by the global fiscal crisis (Behr and Schmidt, 2015). 
So, the research hypotheses (RH) that shall be tested in this dissertation are the 
following: 
 RH 1: The domestic credit granted in the economy is positively related to banks’ 
profitability. Goddard et.al (2004), in their study, used domestic credit as a control 
variable for the determination of bank profitability, in 6 European countries over 
the period 1992- 1998. 
 RH 2: The liquidity risk in the banking system (proxied by the ratio of loans to 
customer deposits) is positively associated with bank profitability. This ratio has 
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been used, as an explanatory variable of bank profitability, in the studies of 
Horvath (2009) and Kundid et al., (2011). 
 RH 3: The more capitalized the banking institution, (i.e. the higher its capital 
relative to assets), the higher its profitability. Studies suggested (see for example 
Kosmidou et al (2005), Flamini et al (2009)) a positive effect of bank capital on bank 
profitability. However, other studies (Asthanasoglou et al (2006) in the case of 
South Eastern European banks) have documented the opposite empirical finding, 
namely, an inverse relationship between bank equity capital and bank profitability. 
 RH 4: The less efficient the banking institution (in terms of managing its costs 
relative to its revenues), the lower its profitability. A relevant metric that captures 
the degree of bank efficiency, is the ratio of cost to income (see ECB (2010)). The 
relationship between bank profitability and efficiency has been a popular issue in 
relevant literature. A positive relationship is expected to exist between the 
aforementioned variables (see Akbas, 2012). 
 
1.2.2 The Importance of the Study 
 
The importance of the topic stems from the fact that, since most German firms are 
financed by bank credit, the effect of the fiscal crisis on Germany’s banking sector could 
easily spill over to the real economy, should a credit-flow restriction on the private sector 
takes hold, in the wake of the crisis. Indeed, as Figure 1-1 shows, bank credit growth to 
Germany’s non-financial private sector (i.e. non-financial corporations and households) was 
quite dynamic, lasting until November 2008, when it was heavily disrupted. If fact, as of 
January 2009, the growth of bank credit was negative, and it was not until December 2010, 
that it bounced back to a positive growth rate.  
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Figure 1-1: Bank Credit Growth to the Domestic Non-Financial Sector, Germany 
Source: Bundesbank 
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1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some main facts 
concerning the German banking system. German firms financing is mostly relied upon the 
banking sector, and households hold a larger share of their financial wealth in the form of 
bank deposits, compared to US counterparts. As a result, the German capital markets, based 
on their, relatively small, number of listed companies and low stock and bond market 
capitalization, became less developed. Section 3 present the literature review. Section 4 
presents the econometric model that will be employed to assess the effect of the fiscal crisis 
on bank performance. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the study, and finally 
Section 6 concludes the dissertation. 
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2. THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM 
 
 
This Chapter begins with the presentation of the “three-pillared” nature of the German 
banking system, comprising of three separate groups of banks (Section 2.1). 
Then, since any bank-business model can be analyzed along the structure of liabilities 
and assets (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015), these dimensions are discussed in terms of the 
German banking system (Section 2.2). Next, since the bank’s business activities have a major 
bearing on its earnings structure, the latter is the second dimension; put differently it is 
possible to differentiate between bank-business models in terms of their profitability and 
risk profile, and the impact of a fiscal crisis (Section 2.3). The third dimension is the 
institution’s legal form, which can largely dictate an individual bank’s size, the number of 
similarly structured institutions and branches as well as the density of the branch network 
(not discussed in this dissertation). 
 
 
2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN BANKING SECTOR 
 
As it has already been pointed out, a unique feature of the German banking sector is its 
“three-pillar” structure, comprised of (a) private commercial banks, (b) savings banks, and (c) 
the cooperative banks; strictly speaking, there is an additional pillar, namely that of ‘other 
banks’ (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1: The Structure (“Four Pillars”) of the German Banking System 
A. PrivateCommercial Banks B.Savings-Banks Group 
C. Cooperative- Banks 
Group 
D. Special Banks 
A1. Big Banks B1. Primary Savings Banks 
(“Sparkasen”) 
C1. Primary Co-
operative banks 
D.1 Realkredit. 
A2. Regional Banks B2. Landensbanken C2. Regional Institutions D2. Bausparkassen 
A3. Branches of Foreign Banks 
  
D3. Banks with 
Special Tasks 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
Private sector banks (Pillar 1), having a private-ownership structure, are profit-oriented. By 
contrast, the banks in the second and the third pillar are not profit oriented, as the task of 
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the primary institutions in the savings-banks group (Pillar 2) and the cooperative- banks 
group (Pillar 3) is that of providing “financial services to the public and acting as house banks 
to German small and medium-sized companies” (Detzer, 2014). The institutions that belong 
to the two aforementioned groups, adopt the generally accepted ‘regional principle’. This 
principle is translated in geographical concentration of their business activities, and 
simultaneously, in loose competition among counterparts. These institutions cooperate 
rather than compete in the market. 
An overview of the basic characteristics of Germany’s banking system, in 2000 and 
2014, is provided in what follows. 
To begin with, Figure 2-1 presents the absolute number of institutions, in each pillar, 
for the years 2000 and 2014. The figure 2-1 indicates that in year 2000, the German Banking 
system consisted of 294 private commercial banks, 575 saving-group banks, and 1.796 
cooperative-group banks. Fourteen years later, in year 2014, the German Banking system 
consisted of almost the same number of private commercial banks (296), less saving-group 
banks (425), and significantly less cooperative-group banks (1,052). 
Deductively, in 2000 there were 2,700 banking institutions in total. The second and 
third pillar aggregate (savings and cooperative-group banks) accounted for about 86% 
(=2371/2740) of total banking institutions in the German banking system, while private 
commercial banks accounted for only 10% (=294/2740). Fourteen years later, the total 
number of German banking institutions dropped sharply to 1,830 and consequently the 
percentage of banks falling into the second and third pillar fell to about 81% (=1477/2740) of 
total banking institutions, while that of private commercial banks increased to 16% 
(=296/2740) of total banking institutions. 
 
9 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Number of Banks by Banking Group, 2000 and 2014 
Note: PSB= Private Sector Banks, SAVB= Savings Banks, COPB= Co-operative Banks. The total number 
of banking institutions was 2,700 in 2000 and 1.830 in 2014. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (for the data) 
 
Then, Figure 2-2 presents the market share, in terms of the value total assets, of each 
banking group in 2000 and 2014.  In 2000, the 294 private commercial banks controlled 28% 
of banking-sector assets, that is, each private commercial bank controlled, on average 0.10% 
of total German banking assets, while in 2014, the 296 private commercial banks controlled 
39% of banking-sector assets; hence the group increased its grip on banking-sector assets by 
about 40%, each private commercial bank controlled, on average 0.13% of total German 
banking assets. 
When it comes to the savings-group banks, in 2000, the 575 financial institutions of 
this category had under their control 35% of banking-sector assets, while in 2014, the by-
then 425 banks of the group controlled 28% of banking-sector assets. So, hence this group of 
banks reduced its control over total bank assets by 20%, each bank in the savings-banks 
group controlled, on average, 0.07% of total German banking assets.  Finally, as far as the co-
operative-group banks is concerned, in 2000, the 1,726 co-operative banks held 12 % of total 
German banking-sector assets, while in 2014, there were 1,052 banks in that group 
controlling 14% of banking-sector assets. So, in total the third-pillar banks increased their 
markets over total bank assets by about 17%, while each co-operative bank controlled, on 
average, 0.01% of total German banking assets. 
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Figure 2-2: Market Share (in terms of Total Assets) of Banks by Banking Group, 2000 and 2014 
Note: PSB= Private Sector Banks, SAVB= Savings Banks, COPB= Co-operative Banks, 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Figure 2-3 depicts average profitability, in terms of the average Return on Equity (ROE), of 
each banking group over the period 1994- 2010. Over the aforementioned period, the 
average, pre-tax ROE was 7.1% for private commercial banks, 8.45% for the Saving-Banks 
group, and 9.65% for the co-operative banks group. Within, the Savings-Banks group, the 
average pre-tax ROE of the primary savings banks was 12.8%, while that of the 
Landesbanken just a mere 4.1%. 
 
Figure 2-3: Profitability by Banking Group, 2000 and 2014 
Note: PSB= Private Sector Banks, SAVB= Savings Banks, COPB= Co-operative Banks, 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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2.1.1 The Private Commercial Banks 
 
Private commercial banks, in Germany, consist of (a) the Big (Four) Banks, (b) the 
Regional Banks, and (c) Branches of Foreign Banks (Behr and Schmidt, 2015) (see Table 2-1). 
 
The Big Four Banks 
 
Four big German banks, namely Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, UniCredit, and 
Postbank prevail in the first pillar of the national banking system. These banks operate an 
abundance of branch networks and offer all types of banking services to a wide spectrum of 
clients in Germany and worldwide. (Behr and Schmidt, 2015) 
Until the onset of the recent crisis, there were five (and not four) Big Banks, which 
dominated the German system, namely Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, 
Deutsche Postbank AG and HypoVereinsbank (IMF, 2011). Then during the fiscal crisis, the 
Big Banks came on the brink of bankruptcy only to be rescued by the state’s intervention. 
Specifically, the German government created in October 2008 a rescue scheme, by the name 
Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin), which raised about 480 billion euros (that 
is, around 9.1% of German GDP) to bail out the German banking system. Eventually, 
Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Postbank AG were absorbed by Commerzbank, in which the 
German State holds 17%, and Deutsche Bank, respectively. 
These institutions adopt an international orientation in business activities and engage 
in numerous transactions in international capital markets. They are considered to be strong 
profit seekers. Traditionally, the Big Banks acted as the main banking partners of Germany’s 
major industrial enterprises (Deutshe Bundesbank 2015), providing them with long-term 
credit for investment. Interestingly these close ties materialized in cross-shareholdings and 
supervisory board seats. This phenomenon altered when the big banks’ business model 
came under pressure in the late 1970s. Consequently, they gradually moved into investment 
banking and trading activities reducing, simultaneously, their links to the industrial sector. 
The rest of the private banking sector consists of regional banks or branches of foreign 
banks. 
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Regional Banks and Foreign Subsidiaries 
 
Many institutions falling within the first pillar of the German banking system are 
regional banks and other commercial banks. These are comparatively smaller in size 
(Deutshe Bundesbank 2015). Their operations are geographically concentrated and focused 
on household and non- financial corporation lending. Capital adequacy is secured via a large 
depositor base. Hence, their business models resemble that of savings banks and credit 
cooperatives. As already pointed out, competition is loose between savings banks and credit 
cooperatives; this characteristic derives from their regional focus. 
Lastly, this category of private commercial banks also includes Germany- based 
subsidiaries of international banks, adding up to the heterogeneous character of the 
grouping. 
 
2.1.2 The Savings-Banks Group 
 
The second pillar of the German banking system involves the savings-bank group, 
which consists of (a) the primary savings banks, called “Sparkassen”; and (b) the regional 
banks called “Landesbanken”; these banks are primarily owned by the public savings banks 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). In 2014, the savings-group banks consisted of 416 entities 
(legally independent) whereas the regional Landesbanken numbered 9 entities (see Fig. 2-4). 
The primary savings banks are municipally, or county controlled. Their founding 
objective is to act in favor of the public interest. This objective moderate profit seeking, 
nonetheless loss making remains quite unacceptable. These institutions promote local 
cultural, social and economic development (see Hakenes et al. (2015)). 
Indeed, it has been documented (see for example Behr et al. (2013)) that the lending 
practices of the German savings banks have contributed to the reduction of financial 
constraints, which Small and Medium-Size (SMEs) face in Germany. Further, there is no 
evidence that savings banks underperform their privately-owned peers of the first-pillar 
banks (Behr et al. 2013). Finally, it needs to be emphasized that German savings banks seem 
to follow, relatively, less cyclical lending practices (Behr et al.,2015), that is, they tend to 
reduce lending in bullish conditions of the business cycle and step it up in the bearish 
equivalents. 
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As, it was pointed out (see Fig. 2-2), the entire savings-group, in terms of aggregate 
total assets, is less that of the private commercial banks, while the respective total assets of 
the local savings banks and the Landesbanken are almost equivalent. Indicatively, in 2000, 
the 562 primary savings banks (see Fig. 2-4) had under their control 16% (see Fig. 2-5) of 
banking-sector assets, while in 2014, the 461 banks of the group controlled 14% of banking-
sector assets. On average, each primary savings bank controlled 0.03% (=16%/562) of total 
German banking assets in 2000 and 2014.   When it comes to the Landesbanken, 13 of them 
in 2000 controlled 20% of banking-sector assets in that year, and the 9 such banks in 2014 
controlled 14% of banking-sector assets. On average, therefore, each Landesbank controlled 
1.5% of total German banking assets in 2000 and 1.56% in 2014. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4:Number of Banks in the Savings-Banks Group, 2000 and 2014 
 
Note: PR.SAV= Primary Savings Banks, RE.SAV=Regional Savings Banks (Landesbanken) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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Figure 2-5:Market Share, in terms of Total Banking Assets, of Banks in the Saving-Group, 2000 and 
2014 
Note: PR.SAV= Primary Savings Banks, RE.SAV=Regional Savings Banks (Landesbanken) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
In terms of bank deposits, in 2000, the 562 primary savings banks held 26% of banking-
sector assets, and in 2014, the 461 banks of the group still controlled the same volume (25%) 
of banking-sector deposit (see Fig. 2-6). When it comes to the Landesbanken, 13 of them in 
2000 controlled 13% of banking-sector deposits in that year, and the 9 such banks in 2014 
controlled 9% of banking-sector deposits. 
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Figure 2-6: Market Share, in terms of Total Bank Deposits, of Banks in the Saving-Group, 2000 and 
2014 
Note: PR.SAV= Primary Savings Banks, RE.SAV=Regional Savings Banks (Landesbanken) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
In 2001, the EU ruled that state guarantees provided to public banks (Anstaltslast and 
Gewährträgerhaftung) are illegal, impeding healthy competition. In 2001-2, an agreement 
was reached between the German government, the public-sector banks and the EU; as a 
result, the German law adjusted, and some 600 public banks spent a transitional period until 
the guarantees were abolished. 
The public banking sector held, through this pillar 28% of the total assets of Germany's 
banking sector in 2014 (see Fig. 2-2). The sector is organized horizontally (spatially) and 
vertically, as municipalities and local authorities control the local “Sparkassen”, while the 
regions, Länder, control the Landesbanken. Other public institutions control development 
banks (Förderbanken), like for example the KfW development bank, which constitutes the 
main pillar of the country's development activity. 
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The Landesbanken 
 
The Landesbanken are the central credit institutions of the system’s second pillar, and 
they perform transactions which the primary savings banks themselves cannot, because they 
are either too small, or operate only in each region. 
As an implication of the role described above, these banks play a vital role in wholesale 
banking and capital market businesses, contending an equal role with large private 
commercial banks, first and foremost the big banks. Local institutions of credit cooperatives, 
surpass the Landesbanken in redistributing liquidity among the associated primary 
institutions. Consequently, they operate mainly in the interbank and capital market. 
The Landesbanken are established on a dual objective. Firstly, they offer banking 
services to regional authorities. Secondly, they act as central institutions for the savings 
banks in their prefectures. Additionally, they offer a wide range of commercial and 
investment banking activities. 
Almost all local savings banks are governed by public law. They are closely affiliated 
with the public bodies administering the local area in which they function. Their operations 
are legitimately restricted to local level. County and municipal authorities have no ownership 
rights in Landesbanken, at the same time they act as owner-like supporting institutions. 
In most cases, the mayor or the political head of a county is the chairperson of a 
savings bank’s administrative council. Formerly, a supporting entity had the formal 
responsibility to assure the functioning of ‘its’ savings bank (the so-called maintenance 
obligation) and to guarantee all obligations of a savings bank (the so-called guarantee 
obligation). These public guarantees were abolished in 2005, based on an agreement 
between the German Government and the EU Commission, as already discussed previously. 
This agreement was reached in 2001 after the Association of Private Banks had filed a 
complaint against the public banks, arguing that these forms of public support were 
incompatible with the EU rules concerning state aid and EU competition laws; for details see 
Schmidt (2009). However, as far as savings banks are concerned, these guarantees were 
never invoked after World War II. 
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Even though local authorities play a vital role in Landesbank functions, they are not 
normally entitled to declare any share of their profits. Landesbanks retain the largest portion 
of their profits either to secure their capital base, or to finance public welfare projects. This 
is consistent to the savings bank main objective, namely the assistance of local population 
and authorities towards a developing local economy, neglecting, if necessary, profit seeking. 
Nevertheless, they are obliged to function effectively and in a prosperous manner.  
 
2.1.3 The Cooperative Banking Group 
 
The structure of the cooperative banking sector resembles the savings bank 
counterpart. In 2014, the sector consisted of 1,050 primary cooperative banks, 2 regional 
institutions and a range of specialized institutions at the national level. 
These types of banks comprise the third pillar of the German banking system. 
Cooperative banks possess an incremented degree of independency. In terms of size, this 
grouping represents about half the size of the two other pillars; if the criterion of total assets 
is applied. The cooperative banking group is composed of two parts: the local cooperative 
banks and the central financial and non-financial institutions of the group. 
The cooperative banks also adopt a dual mission: they must support the economic 
undertakings of their customers and at the same time operate as sustainable businesses. 
 
2.1.4 Other Banks 
 
As already discussed, the German banking system composes of three pillars. Some 
economists argue the existence of a fourth pillar, named ‘other banks’ which includes 
mortgage banks, building and loan associations and the so-called special purpose banks, 
(‘Förderbanken’), such as the government-owned KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) 
banking group, currently Germany’s second largest bank. However, the heterogeneity of the 
entities comprising this group is significant. Therefore, this group is not referred as the 
fourth pillar. In what follows, we do not take this group into account 
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2.2 THE ASSET AND LIABILITIES STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM 
 
A bank-business model can be studied and analyzed along three dimensions (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2015). The first dimension involves the banking institution’s sources of funding 
and its lending activities, i.e. the structure of assets (sub-section 2.2.1) and liabilities (sub-
section 2.2.2). The earnings structure stemming from the bank’s business operations is the 
second dimension; put differently it is possible to differentiate between bank-business 
models in terms of their profitability and risk profile, and the impact of a fiscal crisis (Section 
2.3). The third dimension is the institution’s legal form, which can largely influence an 
individual bank’s size, the number of similarly structured institutions and branches as well as 
the density of the branch network (not discussed in this dissertation) 
 
2.2.1 The Structure of the German Banks’ Assets 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Asset Structure for German Banking Groups, 2015 
 
Note: 1 Inter alia derivative financial instruments in the trading portfolio 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
 
2.2.2 The Structure of the German Banks’ Funding 
 
A bank’s funding mix is one of the main factors along which a banking institution can 
be categorized (see Bank for International Settlements, 2014). 
The major bulk of bank funding comes from three sources, namely, (a) through the 
creation of liabilities to (a1) the non-bank private sector and (a2) the MFI sector; and (b) 
through (securitized) debt issuance (see Fig. 2-8). Two additional sources of bank funding 
consist of equity capital, and, as of the 1990s, derivatives funding, in the form, for example, 
of liquidity swaps (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). 
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Figure 2-8: Liabilities Structure for German Banking Groups, 2015 
Note: 1 Inter alia derivative financial instruments in the trading portfolio. 2 Subscribed 
capital, reserves, less reported loss, plus the “fund for general banking risks” item from the 
banking statistics. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
 
Liabilities Creation as a Source of Bank Funding 
 
A bank can obtain funding by creating liabilities to the non-bank private sector and the 
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) sector. 
The prominent source of funding for German banking institutions, nearly 45% of total 
assets on a long-run average, is liabilities to entities other than financial ones, namely 
households’ deposits and deposits of non-financial corporation’s (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2015). Such deposits materialize via overnight deposits, savings deposits and time deposits. 
Furthermore, insurers, which mainly provide long- term funding (interalia registered bank 
bonds), are a major creditor group in the non- bank segment. 
Liabilities to MFIs, account, on average, for another 25% of total assets funding for the 
German banking institutions (two thirds domestically and one- third from abroad). Short- 
term interbank liabilities are used mainly to settle liquidity in the money market. Moreover, 
long-term interbank liabilities make up more than 50% of total equivalents, having duration 
two years or more. Besides intra- group or intranet-work funding, these are primarily 
deposits. 
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Bond Issuance and Equity Capital as a Source of Bank Funding 
 
Banks issue bank bonds to raise both short- and long- term capital. Bonds represent 
20% of German banks’ capital on a long- run average. 
A typical bank business model is described by the vital role of debt capital in 
proportion to total assets. Therefore, equity to total assets ratio is supposed to be 
significantly lower than that of non- financial corporations. The German banking system is 
characterized by an equity to total assets ratio of 4% (on long term average), classifying it to 
the 13rd position in European scale, a record well below midtable. 
 
21 
 
 
2.3 EARNINGS STRUCTURE AND THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE GERMAN 
BANKING SECTOR 
 
The structure of a bank’s earnings has implications concerning how hard a credit institution 
could be hit whenever a fiscal crisis strikes the economy. 
On the one hand, a “traditional” bank-business model based mainly on deposit-
financed lending could have survived the crisis almost entirely unscathed. However, a 
consistently low interest rate environment, like currently, causes serious doubts on the 
sustainability of the institution’s interest income, deriving from traditional lending 
operations. The seemingly simple solution to the problem would be the expansion of the 
volume of the institution’s lending and deposit business. 
On the other hand, a “non-traditional” model of banking, because it does not focus 
primarily on traditional lending and deposit funding, could be hit hard by a fiscal crisis. This is 
so because “non-traditional” banking involves a greater diversification of income sources, 
through an expansion into the field of investment banking or proprietary trading, and an 
increasing role for non-interest income relative to interest income. This type of business 
diversification comes in hand with incremented income volatility. 
Put differently, during a fiscal crisis, the weak bank profitability, which normally 
accompanies the adoption of a non-traditional banking model, would be down to losses 
generated from the trading section of the bank business.  In turn, reduced bank earnings 
imply a higher dependence of the banking institution on its shareholders’ willingness to 
cover any losses with capital injections. Although the prospect of weak bank profitability, 
during a fiscal crisis, is a relatively established fact, many big banks (in Germany and all over 
the world) instead do not opt for traditional lending practices (which, other things being 
equal, offer hefty earnings opportunities), because they tend to require more capital for 
regulatory reasons (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). 
The period preceding the financial crisis, was characterized by superior return figures 
for big banks as opposed to Landesbanken (and in general other larger German banking 
institution) despite the active engagement of the former in investment banking. 
Up until the fiscal crisis, the big banks had a superior profitability than the 
Landesbanken (and in general other larger German banking institution) and the regional 
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institutions of credit cooperatives, albeit some of the former were significantly more active 
in investment banking than the latter (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). However, since both Big 
Banks and the Landesbanken relied, to a larger or a smaller degree, on the non-traditional 
banking model, their potential for generating extra capital during the fiscal crisis – 
considering their weak profitability– was severely limited, and they would have been 
liquidated had it not been for government support. Specifically, over the period 2008- 2013, 
the German taxpayers provided the German financial sector with an assistance, in the form 
recapitalizations and relief measures for assets (SoFFin), to the tune of close to €144 billion 
(Financial Market Stabilization Agency, 2014). The SoFFin program granted assistance to the 
following credit institutions in Germany: Aareal Bank AG, Bayerische Landesbank, 
Commerzbank AG, CorealCredit Bank AG, Dόsseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG, Hypo Real 
Estate, HSH, Nordbank, AG, IKB Deutsche Industriebank, AG, 
Sicherungseinrichtungsgesellschaft deutscher Banken mbH, Westdeutsche Landesbank. 
Most German savings banks and credit cooperatives, as well as plentiful regional 
banks, employed the model of “traditional banking” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015). The 
immediate consequence was that savings banks and credit cooperatives profitability 
sustained during the crisis, taking on incremented interest rate risks. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Literature presumes banking institutions as maximum-profit seekers. Shareholders are 
closely monitoring the returns on their investments. There is a wide range of profitability 
ratios to assess the return on their investments. Profit maximization derives from effective 
management of inputs and outputs. The optimal relationship between inputs and outputs is 
a matter of key importance for bank managers, affecting seriously bank profitability. Market 
power also enables banks to increase output pricing or / and decrease the cost of acquiring 
inputs. Nevertheless, maximum profits are not always attained. Potential causes are related 
to risk tolerance and differentiation, agency cost issues between management and 
shareholders, imperfect market competition conditions and managerial inefficiency when 
handling inputs and outputs. 
Vital concepts closely associated with maximum bank profitability, are risk and 
diversification. Shareholders must consider the trade-off between return and risk, in their 
investment strategies. It is generally accepted that when it comes to profit distribution, 
shareholders are indifferent between dividends and capital gains on their shares. This norm 
has the following prerequisites; homogeneous risk preferences for all banks, or alternatively 
risk and return figures are explained through a simple homothetic function. This is not the 
case in the German banking system, where an important segment of banking entities –e.g. 
cooperative banks- is extremely risk averse and does not comply with the standard profit 
maximization model. Additionally, this segment owns less diversified asset portfolios with 
prevailing local virtues. There is a growing literature on modeling the risk and return trade-
off in banking environments. For example, Hughes et al (2000) and DeYoung et al (2001) 
incorporated risk in their study of bank performance. Koetter (2004) applied this model to 
the German banking system. This project does not look at profit maximization from this 
respect. 
Incentives constitute the second parameter in bank’s profit maximization. 
Contradicting pursuits may occur between shareholders and management. The first group, 
24 
 
known as principal, requires all company’s actions to be taken for the sake of incremented 
profits, whereas the latter group, known as agents, adds a personal agenda to company’s 
actions, neglecting optimal income enhancement, or / and cost minimization strategies. This 
lack of shareholder control is routed in information asymmetries between the two groups of 
interest. This may be the case even for risk-neutral and well-differentiated bank 
shareholders. These asymmetries impede effective management control and allow decisions 
with negative impact, in the form of incremented costs or reduced profits. Diamond (1984) 
argues that asymmetric information between principals and agents, justifies moral hazard 
and other incentive problems for banks. There is a growing literature on agency cost theory 
and possible manners to combat the contradicting pursuits of principals and agents. These 
include pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary incentives and competition criteria. The objective 
is dual; diminish the negative effects of agency cost without undermining management’s 
administrative power. The latter is affected, for example, by external control mechanisms, 
external supervisory boards, or by secured debts and acquisition proposals. 
Bank performance is also affected by competitor’s actions, macroeconomic variables 
and regulation adopted by national and supranational organizations. Hence, bank 
profitability is also depended on bank’s market power. Theoretically speaking, profit 
maximization is equal to cost minimization under perfect competition market conditions. 
Nevertheless, external factors such as regulations and adverse market conditions seriously 
question optimal performance. These factors may have asymmetric effects on profit 
maximization and cost minimization, which ultimately leads to a gap between the two 
objectives. When profits are maximized at a certain level which does not correspond to 
minimum average cost, imperfect competition market conditions prevail. These conditions 
and their implications to bank performance explain, to a great extent, the time variation of 
individual bank’s financial performance, as well as the performance discrepancies among 
competitors. 
Eventually, this project focuses on models that use the bank’s market power to 
account for profitability. 
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3.2 STRUCTURAL APPROACH IN MEASURING BANK PERFORMANCE 
 
The Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) approach presumes the structure of the banking 
system. According to this approach, better performance for banks occurs when an 
incremented level of concentration is observed in the industry. This increased concentration 
is translated into high interest rates charged on credit, attached to low interest rates applied 
on deposits (banks are enabled by market conditions to adopt a collusive behavior). 
Consequently, banks witness enhanced net interest margins and profitability figures (Bikker, 
2004). 
The empirical testing of this hypothesis, undertaken by many researchers, involves the 
formulation of an equation where the dependent variable is any measure of bank 
profitability and the independent variable is a metric of bank concentration. Simultaneously, 
the model incorporates variables to control for alternative factors, different from the 
banking system concentration, that affect bank profitability. The importance of the bank 
concentration variable is validated via a statistically significant coefficient, implying a 
positive relationship between concentration level and bank profitability. 
 
3.3 THE NON-STRUCTURAL APPROACH IN MEASURING BANKING PERFORMANCE 
 
New Industrial Organization Theory is a contemporary methodology, applied when assessing 
bank competition. The theory examines profit maximization based on static market 
conditions. Key characteristic of the method is that unobservable marginal costs can either 
be estimated via bank performance, or they cannot be estimated altogether. It is crucial to 
depict all inherent traits of the industry under testing. The nature of market power is 
determined within a set of alternative assumptions and the assumption of perfect 
competition is an alternative that can be chosen (Bresnahan, 1989:1012). 
The previously described methodology involves two alternatives when it comes to 
assess bank competition. The first uses the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic as proposed by Rosse 
and Panzar (1982,1987) (see Eq. (3.1)). Within this alternative, a specific revenue function is 
utilized to distinguish between different market structures. Bresnahan - Lau (1982, 1989) 
suggested another alternative which uses an index of market power of the banks, resulting 
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from the estimation of a system simultaneous equation. A third approach, this of Hall-
Roeger (1988, 1995), is also commonly used in the literature. 
In an early study, Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) employed the Panzar-Rosse model to 
evaluate the competitiveness of 15 European Union countries’ banking system, over the 
period 1986 -1992. Their empirical results suggested that in most countries monopolistic 
competition market conditions prevailed, whereas levels of competition remained stable 
throughout time, a conclusion confirmed for every individual country. Only two countries, 
Greece and Belgium, experienced perfect competition conditions, based on the value of the 
H- statistic (Greece H = 0.92). 
The Panzar – Rosse model was used by Gibson and Demenagas (2002) in an effort to 
investigate the prevailing market conditions in the Greek banking system, over the period 
1993 – 1999. Two explanatory variables were employed, namely the changes in market 
shares of the financial institutions and the spread evolution between lending and deposit 
rates. The empirical results suggested incremented competition among banks, especially in 
the household deposit and lending (consumer and mortgage loans) segment. Despite the 
intense competition levels, Greek bank’s net interest margin is sustained in high levels, 
implying incomplete competition for some banking products. 
In a similar study, Rezitis (2006) investigated the Greek banking system, over the 
period 1995 to 2004. At that time domestic banks controlled 85% of the national banking 
system, while the remainder was under the control of insurers and foreign banks. The largest 
banks were the National Bank of Greece, Emporiki Bank, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha 
Bank, Piraeus Bank and Eurobank. The first three were state - controlled, while the others 
were privately owned. The Panzar - Rosse model revealed perfect competition conditions 
prevailing in the sector, for the aforementioned period.  
Nevertheless, when the author split the time period in two segments, the empirical 
results suggested that the banking sector was initially (during the first sub-period) operating 
in perfect competition conditions, whereas the second sub-period is characterized by 
monopolistic ones. Additionally, the the Bresnahan - Lau and Hall-Roeger model empirical 
results implied a non-competitive structure of the Greek banking system throughout the 
whole reporting period, and a shift from a competitive to a non-competitive structure, from 
the first to the second period. 
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4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
4.1 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
In line with the literature, and specifically within the structural-approach framework, the 
following model shall be tested: 
Πi,t = X′tβ + C′tγ + εt (4.1)  
Where Πt the performance of bank the banking sector at time t, Xis a column-vector of 
bank-specific variables, C is a column-vector of control, macroeconomic, variables and ε is 
the disturbance term of the model. 
 
4.1.1 The Dependent Variable 
 
The model as presented in the (4.1) formula attempts to model bank performance 
based on bank profitability metrics, such as the bank’s Return on Assets (ROA), or the bank’s 
Return on Equity (ROE). The advantages of immediate and easy calculus, since all primary 
data are available in the annual accounts, may be outweighed by endogenous 
disadvantages. For example, if a banking institution is not operating efficiently this is not 
necessarily have an impact on its profitability (Vesala, 1995). In econometric terms, in such a 
case the model above may suffer from omitted-variable bias. 
 
4.1.2 The Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables used in the study include both bank-specific variables and 
macroeconomic variables. The latter type of variables normally includes the country’s 
economic growth performance and its inflation rate. 
In what follows, there is a brief discussion of the bank-specific variables and the 
macroeconomic variable that will be used in the study. 
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Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity and profitability are two conflicting goals for a banking institution. On the one 
hand, the more liquid the banking institution, i.e. the more cash reserves its holds on its 
books, the safer the bank is deemed by depositors, in case they decide to engage in 
extraordinary withdrawals of their deposited funds. However, since holding cash does not 
earn the bank an interest, the bank’s profitability takes a hit from the high liquidity. On the 
other hand, a bank’s profitability is naturally enhanced whenever they extend loans into the 
economy. However, since loans involve highly illiquid assets, the bank cannot meet any 
emergency demand for cash, which depositors may need, and hence the bank’s liquidity is 
dented. 
We proxy bank liquidity with the variables ‘Credit’ and ‘Lrisk’; these are defined as follows 
1. Credit: Domestic credit extended to private sector, as a percentage of GDP. Since 
loans represent the most (or one of the most) profitable banking assets, we expect a 
positive relationship between bank profitability and credit, that is, as credit rises, so 
does the bank’s profitability. 
2. Lrisk: The ratio of loans to bank deposits. Whenever a banking institution holds a 
higher percentage of its deposit as loans, it should boost its profitability. Thus, the 
higher the Lrisk ratio the higher the bank’s profitability and hence a positive 
relationship is expected between bank profitability and Lrisk. 
 
Bank efficiency 
 
There are many ways to measure a bank’s operational efficiency. ECB (2010) 
propounds cost-to-income ratio (CIR), as a proper bank efficiency measurement. Cost to 
Income Ratio is a ratio of operating expenses to operating revenues and is considered to 
unveil the ability of a bank to generate returns for a given amount of revenues. Hence, CIR 
assesses managerial ability pertaining to income and cost figures. These two variables are 
quite contradicting, since incremented revenues, resulting from high volumes of banking 
activity, require more costs whereas, at the same time, effective bank management is 
associated with lowering cost activities. 
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For this study the variable efficiency, which is the reciprocal of CIR, is used so that an 
increase in the new ratio should point to an improvement in banking efficiency. Hence, we 
expect a positive relationship between bank profitability and efficiency (Akbas, 2012). 
 
Capital Adequacy 
 
An internal factor influencing a bank’s profitability is its capital structure, which states 
the way the bank’s assets are financed (Hassan and Bashir, 2003); in other word it presents 
the proportion of assets backed by liabilities and equities respectively. Capital adequacy is 
presented by the bank equity to total assets ratio. Theoretically speaking, high ratio figures 
classify the institution as risk averse; simultaneously such figures are associated with lower 
returns. Increased equity to total assets ratio adds up to bank’s solvency and moderates 
leverage effect. Nevertheless, financing costs augment, since equity financing is relatively 
more expensive compared to the liability counterpart (Akbas, 2012), and as a result, bank 
profitability depresses. Another perspective to higher solvency is proposed by Athanasoglou 
et al. (2006) who argues that it substantially reduces the risks undertaken by the bank and 
has a positive effect on its performance. Thus, it is not clear, a priori, the expected 
relationship between bank profitability and capital adequacy. 
 
Bank Concentration 
 
Several measures of bank concentration are suggested (see Bikker and Haaf (2002)). 
Concentration ratios incorporate two vital elements; (a) the number of banks (fewness) and 
(b) the distribution of bank sizes (inequality) in each market. Concentration Indices (CI) are 
derived from the following general formula: 
1
n
i i
i
CI s w

  (4.2)  
where si is the market share of bank i, wiis the weight attached to the market share 
and n is the number of banks in the market. Bikker and Haaf (2002) considered ten 
concentration ratios – the k bank Concentration Ratio (CRk ); the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI); the Hall-Tideman Index (HTI); the Rosenbluth Index (RI); the Comprehensive Industrial 
Concentration Index (CCI); the Hannah and Kay Index (HKI); the U Index (U); The 
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multiplicative Hause Index (Hm); the additive Hause Index (Ha); and the Entropy measure (E) 
The most popular indices from the above, namely CRk and HHI, are presented below. 
The k- bank Concentration Ratio (CRk) can be easily derived by adding up the market 
shares of the k largest banks in the market, that is, 
1
k
k i
i
CI s

  (4.3)  
The k variable, which encompasses the number of banks included in the concentration 
index, is arbitrarily determined and does not follow any justification rule. It is obvious that a 
high index figure indicates that the k largest banks incorporated in the index prevail in the 
banking market of the specific country. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is derived from the sum of the squared bank 
market share, of each bank operating in the sector. The algebraic form is presented below: 
2
1
n
i
i
HHI s

  (4.4)  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has two distinctive characteristics, as opposed to the 
previous index. Firstly, it incorporates all banks operating in the industry and secondly, 
attaches a greater weight to larger banks by squaring their market share. 
The HHI index ranges between a minimum of 1/n, when all banks in the market are of 
equal size, and a maximum of unity 1 in the case of monopoly. The more banks operating in 
the banking sector, the less sensitive the HHI index becomes to changes in the number of 
market participants (Davies, 1979). 
A positive coefficient on the concentration explanatory variable validates the 
argument that bank performance is determined by the level of concentration. A non-
significant value actually will imply that the efficiency hypothesis stands. 
Increased market concentration has positive effects on bank performance, in the form 
of enhanced net interest margin (Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Berger, 1991; employing US 
data). In such an environment, banking institutions are induced to (a) pay a lower interest on 
deposits; additionally, these rates are not quickly adjusted to changes in interbank rates, and 
(b) charge high-particular interest rates on loans. 
Sufian and Chong (2008) also apply the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy of 
market concentration. However, the hypothetical existence of a causal relationship between 
market concentration and profitability is still inconclusive. There is an abundance of studies 
that tests market structure and its effect on bank performance, especially in terms of ROA 
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and ROE (Rhoades, 1995; Moore, 1998; Berger, 1995; Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002). As already 
pointed out, empirical evidence does not agree on a relationship pattern, between the level 
of concentration and profitability.  
 
Economic Growth 
 
Economic growth is captured by the variable ‘gdppc’, which represents per capital 
growth of GDP. A positive relationship is expected between economic growth and bank 
profitability. Bullish market conditions encourage loan-financed capital budgeting projects 
whereas they offer incremented chances of business prosperity.  
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4.2 DATA SOURCES 
 
All data on the German Banking system included in this study have been derived from 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the World-Bank database. Table 4-1 presents some details on the 
variables used and their data source. 
 
Table 4-1: Data and Source 
Variable Code/ Name Source 
Return on Equity (%) 
 
Return on equity 
of individual categories of banks 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
Cost-to-Income Ratio (%) GFDD.EI.07 World Bank 
Bank Credit to Bank Deposits (%) GFDD.SI.04 World Bank 
Bank Capital to Total Assets (%) GFDD.SI.03 World Bank 
Domestic Credit to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.14 World Bank 
GDP per Capita (constant LCU) NY.GDP.PCAP.KN World Bank 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter contains the empirical findings of the study, which are presented in three 
sections. Specifically, Section 5-1 presents the results of the financial ratio analysis for the 
German banking sector, Section 5-2 touches on the descriptive statistics of certain variables, 
related to the statistical and regression analysis on the determinants of profitability of the 
German banking system, which is presented in Section 5-3. 
In conducting financial ratio analysis of the German Banking sector, in line with the ECB 
(2010), we examine the sector’s profitability, efficiency, capital adequacy, and liquidity, to 
gain an in-depth insight into bank performance. Bank profitability is captured by the banks’ 
Return on Equity (ROE) or Return on Assets (ROA); efficiency is measured by the ratio of 
bank costs to income; capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of equity capital to total 
assets, while liquidity is proxied by the ratio of bank loans to deposits. 
Literature research classifies the influencing factors of bank profitability in two broad 
categories, namely internal (bank specific) and external (relating to industry and macro 
economy). The first category of influential factors includes banks’ market share and 
capitalization, balance sheet structure, risk pertaining to lending, liquidity risk, business 
model adopted, management of financial inputs and outputs and capital reserves. The 
second category includes –but is not limited to- market concentration and macroeconomic 
figures such as price level changes and economic conditions (upward or downward trends). 
Conditions prevailing in the economy have direct effects on bank profitability. 
Economy slowdown or growth, usually expressed via the per capita GDP changes, affects 
both lending and borrowing business. Whenever we experience positive changes in GDP, 
banks exhibit increased operations deriving from the credit expansion, as well as increased 
deposits. This intense activity usually results in enhanced profitability for banking 
institutions. In contrast, economy downturn affects negatively lending and depositor base 
with analogous results in profitability (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Researchers also suggest 
that price level changes are positively related to bank profitability, since they affect interest 
rates in the same direction. 
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5.1 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS 
 
5.1.1 Profitability Analysis 
 
This study adopts the Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) research pattern, utilizing Return on 
Average Equity (ROAE) and Return on Average Assets (ROAA) to evaluate bank profitability. 
These financial ratios are extremely popular among management executives and are 
commonly used in special reports addressed to business analysts and investors. ROAE is 
derived by dividing after tax profit or loss to average equity. It divulges the yield on 
shareholders’ funds. On the other hand, ROAA is derived by dividing after tax profit or loss to 
average total assets value. This metric divulges the yield accomplished for all investors 
(equity and external borrowers). Both metrics use average figures for either equity or assets 
in an effort to obtain more accurate results, in contradiction to absolute end of year values. 
 Compared to the initial ratio of ROE, ROA depicts all risks resulting from leverage and is 
considered to be a vital bank profitability ratio (Athanasoglou et al., 2005). Researchers note 
that ROA pitfall may be its inability to capture off balance-sheet assets, widely employed by 
European banks. Hence, Goddard et al (2004) suggests ROE superiority when evaluating 
bank profitability. In this study, both metrics, return on average assets (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE), are presented as appropriate performance appraisals. 
Fig. 5.1 shows the profitability of the German Banking sector over the period 2000-
2015. The before-tax return on equity of German Banks dropped from 9.84% in 2000 to 
5.82% in 2015, that is, the average annual decline of profitability was 3.44%. When it comes 
to ROA, for all types of German Banks, dropped from 1.71% in 2000 to 1.49% in 2015, that is, 
the average annual decline of profitability was 0.91%. 
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Figure 5-1: Profitability Ratios for the German Banking Sector, 2000- 2015 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (for the data on ROE) and author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Efficiency Analysis 
 
Fig. 5.2 shows the efficiency of the German Banking sector over the period 2000-2015. 
Specifically, the Operating-Income-to-Cost (OIC) ratio for all types of German Banks 
remained roughly the same over the aforementioned period, slightly declining from 146% in 
2000 to 142% in 2015. 
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Figure 5-2: Cost-to-Income Ratio for the German Banking Sector, 2000- 2015 
Source: World Bank 
 
In order however to come up with an “efficiency ratio”, which signifies an 
“improvement” in banking efficiency whenever its value increases, we have constructed 
such a ratio by dividing the banks’ operating income by their general administrative 
spending and multiplied the result by 100. Fig. 5.3 shows the evolution of this new measure 
of efficiency of the German Banking sector over the period 2000-2015. 
37 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Efficiency Ratio for the German Banking Sector, 2000- 2015 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (for the data) and author’s estimations 
 
5.1.3 Capital-Adequacy Analysis 
 
The most prominent metric to assess capital adequacy is Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), 
an internationally accepted standard. This ratio is widely employed by banks’ management 
teams to decision making and constitutes a risk restrictive factor (Christopoulos et al., 2011). 
The term ‘capital adequacy’ is directly related to the existence of sufficient equity funds to 
confront economy turbulence. The availability of sufficient equity funds diminishes the 
probability of bankruptcy, since it enables bank institutions to depress the cost of funding 
(Kosmidou, 2008). CAR is calculated by dividing the total amount of bank’s equity to total 
assets. 
Fig. 5.4presents the capital adequacy ratio of the German Banking sector over the 
period 2000-2015. Specifically, the ratio of bank capital to total assets, for all types of 
German Banks, increased from almost 4.2% in 2000 to 5.94% in 2015, thus, increasing an 
average annual rate of 2.34%. 
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Figure 5-4: Capital Adequacy for the German Banking Sector, 2000- 2015 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
5.1.4 Liquidity Risk Analysis 
 
Bank liquidity is usually measured by the Loans-to -Deposits ratio (LDR), a ratio which 
indicates liquidity risk (Alexiou and Sofoklis, 2009). This ratio captures the retention of 
deposits made by the managing authorities in order to grant loans, and indirectly the bank’s 
dependence on interbank markets. It is considered to be an appropriate indicator of the 
bank’s adaptability to changes in funding. The lower the ratio is, the higher the accomplished 
liquidity. Increased liquidity is positively related to enhanced profitability, when risk features 
are taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the relationship is not analogous. As in all 
enterprises, increased liquidity levels deduct valuable funds that could be used to finance 
profitable investments. Usually liquid funds gain low rates of return and as liquidity 
requirements increase, bank profitability is challenged (Kosmidou, 2008). 
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Fig. 5.5 shows the liquidity ratio of the German Banking sector over the period 2000-
2015. Specifically, the ratio of bank credit to bank deposits, for all types of German Banks, 
dropped from 130% in 2000 to close to 97% in 2015, thus, dropping an average annual rate 
of close to 2%. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Liquidity Ratio for the German Banking Sector, 2000- 2015 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
5.2 BASIC STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5-1 presents some basic descriptive statistics for the time-series variables under 
consideration.  The results are presented over the whole period, 2000-2015, and over the 
two sub-periods 2000-2008 and 2009-2015 
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Table 5-1: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
n mean s.d. min max 
ROE after Tax 16 3.32 4.14 -7.89 9.04 
ROE before Tax 16 5.30 4.71 -7.40 12.87 
ROA 16 1.55 0.13 1.29 1.72 
Credit 16 96.69 12.70 77.95 115.72 
Adequacy 16 4.58 0.59 4.00 5.94 
Efficiency 16 150.22 7.52 136.39 163.50 
Concentration 16 85.66 1.26 83.22 88.47 
Liquidity Risk 16 140.11 30.38 96.69 187.01 
Inflation Rate 16 1.49 0.66 0.23 2.63 
GDP Growth Rate 16 1.30 2.50 -5.38 5.60 
 
PERIOD: 2009-2015 
ROE after Tax 7 3.63 2.75 -2.02 6.68 
ROE before Tax 7 5.38 3.02 -0.81 8.57 
ROA 7 1.47 0.08 1.38 1.57 
Credit 7 84.74 6.79 77.95 98.19 
Adequacy 7 5.03 0.64 4.30 5.94 
Efficiency 7 150.42 6.44 142.05 156.66 
Concentration 7 85.19 1.25 83.22 86.65 
Liquidity Risk 7 112.26 12.94 96.69 132.51 
Inflation Rate 7 1.16 0.75 0.23 2.08 
GDP Growth Rate 7 1.00 3.50 -5.38 5.60 
 
PERIOD: 2000-2008 
ROE after Tax 9 3.08 5.13 -7.89 9.04 
ROE before Tax 9 5.25 5.89 -7.40 12.87 
ROA 9 1.61 0.13 1.29 1.72 
Credit 9 105.98 6.77 96.43 115.72 
Adequacy 9 4.23 0.16 4.00 4.50 
Efficiency 9 150.06 8.65 136.39 163.50 
Concentration 9 86.02 1.21 84.19 88.47 
Liquidity Risk 9 161.78 19.96 130.53 187.01 
Inflation Rate 9 1.74 0.49 1.03 2.63 
GDP Growth Rate 9 1.54 1.55 -0.76 3.82 
Source: World Bank and author’s calculations 
 
 
So, for example, over the whole period, the ROE for the all categories of banks was on 
average 5.3%, with a standard deviation of 4.71, while it was roughly the same over the 
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eight-year period 2000-2008 (5.25%)and over the subsequent period 2009-2015 (5.38%). 
When it comes to ROA, over the whole period, the ROA for the all categories of banks was 
on average 1.46%, with a standard deviation of 0.37. Looking at the two sub-periods, we see 
that over the eight-year period 2000-2008, the average ROA was 1.61%, while over the 
subsequent period ROA dropped to 1.27% 
The Operating-Income-to-Cost (OIC) ratio for all the categories of German banks was 
on average 150%, with a standard deviation of 7.5%, over the whole 2000-2015 period. 
Looking at the two sub-periods, we see that over the eight-year period 2000-2008 and the 
subsequent period 2009-2015 period the average OIC ratio was 150%. 
Over the whole period, 2000-2015, the capital-adequacy ratio for the all categories of 
German banks was on average 4.58%, with a standard deviation of 0.59%. Then, over the 
eight-year period 2000-2008, the average capital-adequacy ratio was 4.23%, while over the 
subsequent period the ratio rose to 5.03%Over the whole period, 2000-2015, the ratio of 
bank credit to deposits for the all categories of German banks was on average 140%, with a 
standard deviation of 30%. Then, over the eight-year period 2000-2008, the average ratio 
was 162%, while over the subsequent period the ratio dropped to 113% 
 
5.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 5-2 presents the correlation coefficient for the variables included in the formula. 
Looking at the data in this table there seems to be no multicollinearity problem, as the most 
problematic result is just the correlation between adequacy and efficiency at 0.78 (relatively 
high). Economic theory does not suggest any relationship between these variables. 
Inevitably, we decided to maintain them in the analysis. 
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Table 5-2: Correlation Matrix for the Data 
 ROA ROEbt ROE Credit Adequacy Efficiency Concentration Inflation GDP Growth 
ROA 1.0000 0.1619 0.1183 0.4338 -0.0589 -0.1238 -0.0704 0.0423 -0.3140 
ROEbt 0.1619 1.0000 0.9929 0.0145 -0.0955 -0.2460 0.0433 -0.0176 0.4415 
ROE 0.1183 0.9929 1.0000 -0.0482 -0.0540 -0.2165 0.0317 -0.0110 0.4745 
Credit 0.4338 0.0145 -0.0482 1.0000 -0.7644 -0.5676 0.5356 0.1875 -0.1159 
Adequacy -0.0589 -0.0955 -0.0540 -0.7644 1.0000 0.7875 -0.6057 -0.4916 -0.2358 
Efficiency -0.1238 -0.2460 -0.2165 -0.5676 0.7875 1.0000 -0.3314 -0.4546 -0.0528 
Concentration -0.0704 0.0433 0.0317 0.5356 -0.6057 -0.3314 1.0000 0.1515 0.0420 
Inflation 0.0423 -0.0176 -0.0110 0.1875 -0.4916 -0.4546 0.1515 1.0000 0.4987 
GDP Growth -0.3140 0.4415 0.4745 -0.1159 -0.2358 -0.0528 0.0420 0.4987 1.0000 
Notes: The estimation period is 2000-2015. ROEbt: return on equity before taxes. 
 
 
5.2.3 Stationarity Tests 
 
In this section we test the stationary character of several time series that are used in 
the econometric modelling, the results of which are presented in Section 5.3. The 
stationarity test involves the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. 
Table 5-3 reports the results from performing this stationarity tests on several time 
series. Consider for example, the case of ROE before taxes. Fig. 5-1 showed that the time 
series for ROE before tax follows a stochastic model with no drift, and hence the standard 
Dickey-Fuller test will involve testing the following model 
ΔROEt = φROEt−1 + εt 
In the above model the errors εt are assumed independently and identically 
distributed. The null hypothesis that is being tested is that H0: φ = (ρ − 1) = 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis H1: φ = (ρ − 1) < 0. Note φ = 0, then ρ = 1, that is we have a unit 
root, meaning the time series under consideration is nonstationary, since in that case we will 
have 
ROEt = ROEt−1 + εt  
The estimation of the first model is simple enough as it involves regressing the first 
differences of ROEton  ROEt−1 and examine if the estimated slope coefficient φ̂ is 
statistically different from zero or not. If it is zero, we conclude that ROEtis nonstationary, 
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but if it is negative “enough”, i.e. its absolute value is greater than the absolute value of the 
critical value, then we conclude that the time ROEtis stationary. Under the null hypothesis 
that H0: φ = 0, the value of the t-statistic on the estimated coefficient of ROEt−1 does not 
follow the t distribution even in large samples3. Dickey and Fuller have shown that under the 
null hypothesis that H0: φ = 0, the estimated t value of φ̂ follows the τ(tau) statistic where 
τ =
φ̂
s.e.(φ̂)
. 
For example, in the case of ROE, we see that the tau test statistic is higher in absolute 
value than the critical value (|−2.34| > |−1.95|), hence we reject the unit-root null 
hypothesis thus concluding that the ROE of the German Banking is a stationary time series. 
Note, the estimated model4 involves on lag, and it has as follows 
 
1 1
2.34
0.5820 0.3345t t tROE ROE ROE

       
 
 
 
Table 5-3: Stationarity Tests Results 
 
Variable Tau-Statistic 
Critical 
Value† 
Lags Drift Trend Conclusion 
ROE before 
Tax 
-2.34* -1.95 1 None None Stationary 
credit -3.55** -3.00 1 Yes Yes Trend Stationary 
lrisk -0.439 -3.60 1   Non-Stationary 
adequacy -1.26 -3.60 1   Non-Stationary 
efficiency -0.30 -1.95 1   Non-Stationary 
concentration -0.613 -1.95 1 None None Non-Stationary 
gdppcgr       
Notes: The ADF test is used to test for stationarity of the time series. *(**)Statistically significant 
estimate at the 5%(10%) level of significance. † the reported critical value at the 5% level of 
significance. 
Variable definitioncredit: bank credit extended to private sector as percentage of GDP; gdpgr: 
growth rate in per capita GDP 
 
 
 
                                                 
3That is, it does not have an asymptotic normal distribution 
4Not reported in table 
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Fig. Α-2(Appendix A) presents the evolution of the time series credit, which clearly 
seems to fit the pattern of a stochastic model with a trend, and hence the standard Dickey-
Fuller test will involve testing the following model 
Δcreditt = a + βt + φcreditt−1 + εt 
In the above model the errors εt are assumed independently and identically 
distributed. Again, the null hypothesis being tested is that H0: φ = (ρ − 1) = 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis H1: φ = (ρ − 1) < 0. The estimated τ statisticis τ =
φ̂
s.e.(φ̂)
=
−1.3184
s0.3708
= −3.55, while the critical value is -3.60. So, it is trend stationary. 
 
 
5.3 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 5-4 presents the regression results for various model specifications, depending on the 
banking variable used a regressor. 
In all models, i.e. model 1 through 10, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the ROE before tax for all German banking institutions.  For models 1-5, the estimation 
period runs from 2000 to 2015, while for models 6-10 the corresponding period is 2001-
2015. Models 1-5 use as regressors non-stationary banking time series, while Models 6-10 
use as regressors non-stationary lagged banking time series and stationary time-series. 
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Table 5-4: Regression Results for the Determinant of ROE before Tax 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
log⁡(credit) 0.3241*     
log⁡(lrisk) 
 
0.2973*    
log⁡(adequacy)   0.9641*   
log⁡(efficiency)    0.2979*  
log⁡(concentration)     0.3346* 
gdppc. gr 0.1594** 0.1649** 0.1712* 0.1521** 0.1548** 
?̅?2 0.9048 .9000 0.9091 0.9075 0.9069 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
credit𝑡−1 0.0156*     
credit. gr𝑡 0.0926     
lris𝑡−1  0.0090*    
lrisk. gr𝑡  0.0059    
adequacy𝑡−1   0.2973*   
adequacy. gr𝑡    0.0266   
efficiency𝑡−1    0.0099*  
efficiency. gr𝑡     0.0178  
concentration𝑡−1     0.0177* 
concentration. gr𝑡     0.1299 
gdppc. gr 0.2571** 0.2123** 0.1865** 0.1313 0.1360 
?̅?2 0.8671 0.8266 0.8922 0.8918 0.9047 
 
Notes: *(**) statistically significant estimate at the 5% (10%) level of significance. The estimation 
period for models 1-5 is 2000-2015. The estimation period for models 6-10 is 2001-2015. lrisk: 
the ratio of loans to bank deposits (%); efficiency: the ratio of operating income to operating 
expenses (%); adequacy: the ratio of bank capital to total assets (%); credit: domestic credit to 
private sector (% of GDP); credit.gr: growth rate in domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP); 
gdp.gr: growth rate in per capita GDP; 
 
 
Then Table 5-5 presents the results for stepwise regression. Backward stepwise 
regression omits gradually statistically insignificant variables, delivering ultimately a reduced 
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model. The output from step shows the sequence of models processed. In this case, step 
removed x2 and x4 and left only x1 and x3 in the final (reduced) model. The summary of the 
reduced model shows that it contains only significant predictors. The backward methodology 
is manageable, albeit not appropriate if many variables are incorporated in the equation. In 
such a case, the opposite direction methodology is proposed, namely forward stepwise 
regression, which gradually inserts only statistically significant variables in the tested 
equation. 
 
Table 5-5: Stepwise Regression Results for the Determinant of ROE 
 
Variable Full Model 1 
Variable Full Model 
2 
log⁡(credit) 0.3241* credit𝑡−1 0.0563* 
gdppc. gr 0.1594** credit. gr𝑡 0.3138** 
  lrisk𝑡−1 -0.0423* 
  adequacy. gr𝑡  -0.1114 
  efficiency𝑡−1 0.1243* 
  efficiency. gr𝑡 0.0601 
  concentration𝑡−1 -0.1794* 
?̅?2 0.9048 ?̅?2 0.9485 
Notes: statistically significant estimate at the 5% level of significance. The estimation period is 
2000-2015. credit: domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) _; gdpgr: growth rate in per 
capita GDP; infl: inflation rate; gdpgr: growth rate in per capita GDP; infl: inflation rate; gdpgr: 
growth rate in per capita GDP 
 
 
5.3.1 The Effect of Domestic Credit 
The credit granted from the German banking system to the private sector, is referred as 
domestic credit. The most common unit of measurement is as the percentage of GDP. In 
theory, credit expansion has a positive relationship with bank profitability.  
Indeed, as Table 5-4 shows, the estimated slope coefficient for the (natural logarithm of) 
variable credit is 0.3241, hence the effect of bank credit on German banks’ profitability is 
positive. Both dependent and explanatory variables (ROA and Credit respectively) are 
expressed in terms of natural logarithm. Hence, the change in the value of the Return on 
Assets (dependent variable - ΔROA) is expected to be (approximately) equal to the product 
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of the aforementioned slope estimate (β̂credit = 0.3241), the ratio of the banks’ ROA to 
domestic credit (
ROA
credit
), and the change in the domestic credit (Δcredit).    
As it was shown in Table 5-1, over the whole period, 2000-2015, the average bank ROA for 
all categories of German banks was 1.55%, while the ratio of bank credit extended to whole 
economy by all categories of German banks averaged 97%, with a standard deviation of 
12.7%. So, we may take the ratio of the banks’ ROA to domestic credit to be 
ROA
credit
=
1.55
97
=
0.0160, and the change in the domestic credit to be equal to one standard deviation, ie. 
Δcredit = 13. Hence, if credit to the private sector extended by the German banking system 
increases by 13 percentage points then, the sector’s ROE (on a before-tax basis) is expected 
to increase by just 0.07 (= β̂credit
ROA
credit
Δcredit = 0.3241 ×
1.55
97
× 12)percentage points, of 
just 7 basis points. In other words, the average bank ROA for all categories of German banks 
will increase from 1.55% to 1.62%.  
This finding is in line with those of Goddard et.al (2004), who found, using panel consisting 
of 6 European countries observed over the period 1992- 1998, that domestic credit 
positively affects banks’ profitability.   
 
5.3.2 The Effect of Liquidity Risk 
 
A measurement applied to assess an important variable for banking operations, 
namely liquidity risk, is the ratio of credit to deposits. This ratio exhibits a negative 
relationship when discussed in relation to bank performance. Additionally, the higher the 
ratio the riskier bank management occurs. 
Table 5-4 (model 2) shows, the estimated slope coefficient for the natural logarithm of 
lrisk is 0.2973. Then, as it was shown in Table 5-1, over the whole period, 2000-2015, the 
ratio of bank credit to deposits for the all categories of German banks stood on average at 
140%, with a standard deviation of 30%. Then, over the eight-year period 2000-2008, the 
corresponding ratio was 162%, while over the subsequent period the liquidity risk ratio 
dropped to 113%.Given the average bank ROA for all categories of German banks to the 
tune of 1.55%, we may take the ratio of the banks’ ROA to liquidity risk to be 
𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
=
1.55
140
=
0.0111, and the change in liquidity risk to be equal to one standard deviation, i.e. 𝛥𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 =
30.  
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Hence, if the ratio of bank loans to demand deposits of all German banks increases by 
13 percentage points then, the sector’s ROE (on a before-tax basis) is expected to increase 
by 0.1 (= ?̂?lrisk
𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝛥𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0.2973 ×
1.55
140
× 30)percentage points, of 10 basis points. In 
other words, the average bank ROA for all categories of German banks will increase from 
1.55% to 1.65%.  Similar effects (on banks’ profitability) were also documented in the studies 
of Horvath (2009) and Kundid et al., (2011), albeit of different magnitudes. 
 
5.3.3 The Effect of Capital Adequacy 
 
Our empirical results in Table 5-4 below indicate a statistically significant positive 
relationship between capital adequacy ratio and equity return. The higher the ratio, the 
lower the implied banking risk, as perceived by shareholders. However, in such a case equity 
holder do not benefit from positive leverage effects. The figures in the relevant Table 
indicate that if the capital-equity ratio of the German banking system increases by 1 % then, 
the sector’s ROE is expected to increase by 96 basis points. This empirical result agrees with 
those reported by Kosmidou et al., (2005), concerning the positive effect of bank capital 
reserves on bank profitability, but they are opposite to what was found by Athanasoglou et 
al., (2006), who established an inverse relationship between bank equity capital and bank 
profitability.  
 
5.3.4 The Effect of Bank Concentration 
 
The empirical results presented in Table 5-4, unveil another statistically significant 
variable that determines bank profitability. This variable is the market concentration ratio, 
which has a positive impact on Return on Equity. Specifically, for every one percent increase 
in the aforementioned concentration ratio, the German banking system’s ROE is expected to 
increase by 33 basis points. 
 
5.3.5 The Effect of Efficiency 
 
Management efficiency is approximated via the cost-to-income ratio, as already 
presented in the literature review. As it was pointed out in section (5.1.2), an improvement 
in bank efficiency occurs when income from operations increases or / and the reciprocal 
costs deteriorate. 
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Table 5-4 (model 4) shows, the estimated slope coefficient for the natural logarithm of 
efficiency is 0.2979. Then, as it was shown in Table 5-1, over the whole period, 2000-2015, 
the ratio of bank’s operating income to their admin spending for the all categories of 
German banks averaged 150%, with a standard deviation of 7.5%. Given the an average bank 
ROA for all categories of German banks to the tune of 1.55%, we may take the ratio of the 
banks’ ROA to efficient to be 
ROA
efficiency
=
1.55
150
= 0.103, and the change in efficiency to be 
equal to one standard deviation, i.e. Δefficiency = 7.5 
Hence, if the ratio of banks’ institution revenue to aggregate administrative expenses 
increases by 7.5 percentage points then, the sector’s ROE is expected to increase by 0.02 
(= 0.2979 ×
1.55
150
× 7.5)percentage points, of just 2 basis points. In other words, the 
average bank ROA for all categories of German banks will increase from 1.55% to 1.57%.  
This result concerning the positive relationship between bank profitability and bank 
efficiency is consistent to the findings reported by Akbas (2012) in his study. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This study scrutinized the structure of the German banking system and its performance for a 
period covering years 2000-2015. Four big banks prevail in the private fragment of the 
banking sector, namely Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, UniCredit and Postbank. Big banks 
were characterized by close ties with the well-established German industrial companies. 
These close relationships included long-term credit, as well as cross-shareholdings and 
supervisory board seats. Nevertheless, these ties were radically affected by the changes in 
the banking business environment in the late 1970s. Big banks were induced to move their 
business to investment banking and money trading, abandoning simultaneously their close 
relationships with industrial base. The rest of the private banking sector comprises regionally 
focused banks or branches of foreign banks. Even though savings banks and credit 
cooperatives account for about 80% of credit institutions in Germany, in 2014, their 
combined total assets made up a bit more than 40% of aggregate total assets in the German 
banking system. 
 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS FROM FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS 
 
The preceded financial ratio analysis focused on the appraisal of the German banking 
sector’s profitability, efficiency, capital adequacy, and liquidity. 
Despite the onset of the recent fiscal crisis, and the somewhat significant decline in the 
banks’ efficiency (captured by a rising cost-to-income ratio), the profitability of the German 
Banking system remained almost intact, as it was reflected by Return on (Average) Assets, 
ROA, was not severely affected, as the annual average decline over the period under 
examination was a mere 0.91%. In addition, the German banking system came out of crisis 
with a larger capital adequacy, as the ratio increased over the period under examination, 
and a higher liquidity, as this is captured by the ratio of bank credit to total deposits. 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BANK PROFITABILITY 
 
As already pointed out in the relevant section, literature classifies the banks’ profitability 
influential factors in two groups; the internal (bank-specific) and the external factors (the 
latter pertaining to banking business sector, as well as macroeconomic variables). Economic 
activity changes, usually determined by GDP per capita, affect bank profitability. Business 
related factors, such as depositor base, household and business lending as well as net 
interest margins, are some of the major bank-specific factors that seriously influence bank 
returns. Economic slowdown depresses credit volume, the amount of entrepreneurship 
ventures and consequently financing demand, as well as depositor base. All the above affect 
negatively banks’ profit margins (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Another macroeconomic variable 
that affects bank profitability in a positive manner is the positive inflation rates, since they 
cause interest rates and net interest rates margin increase. 
Our empirical results, as presented in Chapter 5, suggest that German bank 
profitability is affected positively by the proxies for liquidity risk, management efficiency, 
market concentration and general economy performance. The criterion applied to assess 
bank profitability is ROE. In that case only one insignificant variable was detected, namely 
bank size. 
A policy recommendation, for the supervisors, which can be derived from these 
empirical findings, is that of a better surveillance for liquidity risk of banks. A policy 
recommendation for banks’ decision makers would be to monitor liquidity risk indicators 
and cost optimization. 
Upcoming research may focus on the extension of the analysis to each type of bank, 
separately. Further analysis in all types of banks may be based on new data from 2015 and 
on. Moreover, the regulation and use of IFRS 9 can be used in comparison with the results of 
the new stress test in the German Banks. 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 0-1: Inflation Rate and GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 
Source: World Bank and Author’s Calculations 
 
 
Figure 0-2: Credit Extended to the Private Economy by the German Banking System 
Source: World Bank 
 
